A uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium of a dynamic game is a uniform ε-equilibrium in an extended game, where the players observe a public signal at every stage. We prove that a uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium exists in two classes of multiplayer absorbing games, thereby extending earlier works by Solan and Solan (2019, 2018).
Introduction
Existence of uniform equilibrium in stochastic games has been a topic of great interest in the last decades. Shapley (1953) introduced the model of stochastic games, in which players' actions affect both the stage payoff and the state of the game. Shapley proved that every two-player zero-sum stochastic game admits a λ-discounted equilibrium in stationary strategies, for every λ > 0. This result was later extended for multiplayer stochastic games by Fink (1964) and Takahashi (1964) .
A strategy profile is a uniform ε-equilibrium if it is a λ-discounted εequilibrium, for every discount factor λ sufficiently close to 0. Mertens and Neyman (1981) proved that every two-player zero-sum stochastic game admits a uniform ε-equilibrium, for every ε > 0. It is a strategy profile in which each player cannot gain more then ε by deviating from it, for every small enough λ. Vieille (2000) extended this result to every two-player non-zero-sum stochastic game. Solan (1999) proved the existence of a uniform ε-equilibrium in three-player absorbing games. Solan and Vieille (2001) presented the class of quitting games, and proved that if the payoffs satisfy a certain condition, then a uniform ε-equilibrium exists. For additional results on the existence of uniform ε-equilibrium in stochastic games, see Simon (2007 Simon ( , 2012 Simon ( , 2016 . To this day it is not known if every n-player stochastic game admits a uniform ε-equilibrium.
A uniform correlated ε-equilibrium is a uniform ε-equilibrium in an extended game that includes a correlation device. Various versions of uniform correlated ε-equilibrium have been studied, depending on the type of correlation that the device allows. Solan and Vieille (2002) studied extensive-form correlation devices. These are devices that send a private message to each player in every stage. They proved that every multiplayer stochastic game admits a uniform extensive-form correlated ε-equilibrium. Solan and Vohra (2001, 2002) studied a normal-form correlation device, which sends one private message to each player at the outset of the game. They proved that every absorbing game 1 admits a uniform normal-form correlated ε-equilibrium. Recently, Solan and Solan (2019, 2018) studied uniform sunspot ε-equilibria, which are uniform ε-equilibria in an extended game that includes a device, which sends a public message at every stage. They proved that every quitting game, as well as every general quitting game 2 , admits a uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium.
This paper is part of a project whose goal is to prove that every multiplayer stochastic game admits a uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium. Here we will present two classes of absorbing games, spotted games and L-shaped games. Both of these classes are generalizations of quitting games. In quitting games there is a single non-absorbing entry. An absorbing game is spotted if every two non-absorbing entries differ by the actions of at least two players. An absorbing game is L-shaped if there are exactly three non-absorbing entries a 1 , a 2 , and a 3 , and moreover, the action profiles a 1 and a 3 differ by the action of Player 1 only, while the action profiles a 1 and a 2 differ by the action of Player 2 only. We will show that every game in these classes admits a uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium.
The paper is organized as follows. The model and the main results are described in Section 2. The proof of the main result for the first class presented, spotted games, appears in Section 3. The proof of the main result for the second class presented, L-shaped games, appears in Section 4. Discussion appears in Section 5.
Model and Main Results

Absorbing Games and General Quitting Games
In this paper we study stochastic games with a single non-absorbing state. These games, called absorbing games, were first studied by Kohlberg (1974) .
Definition 2.1 An absorbing game is a tuple Γ = (I, (A i ) i∈I , P, u), where • I = {1, 2, ..., |I|} is a non-empty finite set of players.
• For every player i, A i is a non-empty finite set of actions. Denote the set of all action profiles by A = × i∈I A i .
• u : A → [0, 1] I is a payoff function.
• P : A → [0, 1] I is an absorption probability function.
The game proceeds as follows: At every stage t ∈ N, until absorption occurs, each player i ∈ I chooses an action a t i ∈ A i , and receives the payoff u i (a t ), where a t := × i∈I a t i . With probability P (a t ), the game is absorbed and the players' payoff is u(a t ) in each subsequent stage. Otherwise, the game continues to the next stage.
An action profile a ∈ A is absorbing if P (a) > 0, and non-absorbing if P (a) = 0. For a mixed action profile x ∈ ∆(A), we denote P (x) := a∈A x(a) · P (a). Solan and Solan (2018) defined a class of absorbing games, called general quitting games. In this class of games, each player has two types of actions: continue actions and quitting actions, and the game is absorbed as soon as at least one player plays a quitting action.
Definition 2.2 An absorbing game Γ = (I, (A i ) i∈I , P, u) is a general quitting game if for every player i ∈ I, the action set A i can be divided into two non-empty finite disjoint sets A i = C i · ∪ Q i that satisfy the following condition: for every action profile a ∈ A, if a j ∈ Q j for some j ∈ I, then P (a) = 1. Otherwise, a ∈ × i∈I C i and P (a) = 0.
We will denote a general quitting game by Γ = (I, (C i ) i∈I , (Q i ) i∈I , P, u). For every i ∈ I, the actions in C i are called continue actions, and the actions in Q i are called quitting actions.
Definition 2.3 An absorbing game is called generic if every two distinct action profiles a = a ′ ∈ A yield a different payoff for every player; that is, u i (a) = u i (a ′ ) for every i ∈ I.
Definition 2.4 An absorbing game Γ = (I, (A i ) i∈I , P, u) is recursive if every non-absorbing action profile yields payoff 0; that is, for every a ∈ A, if P (a) = 0 then u(a) = 0.
Definition 2.5 A recursive absorbing game Γ = (I, (A i ) i∈I , P, u) is positive if the payoff function is non-negative; that is, for every a ∈ A we have u i (a) ≥ 0.
A special class of general quitting games is quitting games, previously studied by Flesch et al. (1997) and Solan and Vieille (2001) .
Strategies and Payoff
Definition 2.7 Let Γ = (I, (A i ) i∈I , P, u) be an absorbing game. A strategy of player i in Γ is a function σ i : ∪ t∈N A t−1 → ∆(A i ). A strategy profile is a vector σ = (σ i ) i∈I of strategies, one for each player.
Definition 2.8 A strategy σ i of player i is called stationary if it depends solely on the current stage, and not on past play. Since absorbing games have only one non-absorbing state, a stationary strategy of player i is equivalent to a probability distribution in ∆(A i ). A strategy profile σ is called ε-almost stationary if it is a stationary strategy, supplemented with threats of punishment.
We will study the concept of uniform equilibrium. To this end, we present the T -stage payoff, the discounted payoff, and the undiscounted payoff.
Definition 2.9 Let T ∈ N, and let Γ = (I, (A i ) i∈I , P, u) be an absorbing game. The T -stage payoff of player i in Γ under strategy profile σ is given by
Definition 2.10 Let λ ∈ (0, 1], and let Γ = (I, (A i ) i∈I , P, u) be an absorbing game. The λ-discounted payoff of player i in Γ under strategy profile σ is given by
Definition 2.11 Let ε > 0 and let Γ = (I, (A i ) i∈I , P, u) be an absorbing game. A strategy profile σ is an ε-equilibrium if no player can increase her payoff by more then ε by deviating from σ. That is, for every player i ∈ I and every strategy σ ′ i of player i,
If this payoff function is a λ-discounted payoff for some λ ∈ [0, 1], then this equilibrium is called λ-discounted ε-equilibrium. If this payoff function is a T -stage payoff for some T ∈ N, then this equilibrium is called T -stage εequilibrium. Fink (1964) proved that for every λ ∈ (0, 1), every stochastic game, and in particular, every absorbing game, admits a λ-discounted 0-equilibrium in stationary strategies. The concept of uniform ε-equilibrium was introduced by Mertens and Neyman (1981) .
Definition 2.12 Let ε > 0. A strategy profile σ is a uniform ε-equilibrium if it satisfies the following two conditions:
(ι) There exists λ 0 ∈ (0, 1] such that σ is a λ-discounted ε-equilibrium for every λ ∈ (0, λ 0 ).
(ιι) There exists integer T 0 ∈ N such that σ is a T -stage ε-equilibrium for every T ≥ T 0 .
It follows from Vrieze and Thuijsman (1989) that every two-player non-zero sum absorbing game admits a uniform ε-equilibrium, for every ε > 0. Solan (1999) extended this result to every three-player absorbing game. To date it is not known whether every four-player absorbing game admits a uniform ε-equilibrium, for every ε > 0.
Definition 2.13 Let Γ = (I, (A i ) i∈I , P, u) be a positive recursive absorbing game. The undiscounted payoff of player i in Γ under action profile strategy σ, is defined by
The equilibrium described in Definition 2.11 is called undiscounted ε-equilibrium if the payoff function used in the definition is the undiscounted payoff. It follows from Solan and Vieille (2001) that there is an equivalence between uniform ε-equilibrium and undiscounted ε-equilibrium in positive recursive absorbing games.
The following lemma allows us to focus on generic games. Though the lemma is stated for the concept of uniform ε-equilibrium, it applies to all notions of equilibrium that are mentioned in the paper.
Lemma 2.14 Let ε > 0, and let Γ = (I, (C i ) i∈I , (Q i ) i∈I , P, u) and Γ ′ = (I, (C i ) i∈I , (Q i ) i∈I , P, u ′ ) be two absorbing games with the same absorption probability function. If u − u ′ ∞ ≤ ε, then a uniform ε-equilibrium of Γ is a uniform 3ε-equilibrium of Γ ′ .
Sunspot Equilibrium
We extend the game Γ by introducing a public correlation device: at the beginning of every stage t ∈ N the players observe a public signal ζ t ∈ [0, 1] that is drawn according to the uniform distribution, independently of past signals and play. The extended game is denoted by Γ sun . A strategy of player i in the extended game Γ sun is a measurable function ξ i :
Definition 2.15 Every uniform ε-equilibrium of the game Γ sun is called a uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium of Γ.
The main goal of this paper is to study uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium in absorbing games.
Uniform Sunspot Equilibrium in General Quitting
Games Solan and Solan (2018) proved the existence of a uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium in general quitting games in which every player has a single quitting action. This result relies on linear complementarity problems, which we present now.
Definition 2.16 Given an n × n matrix R and a vector q ∈ R n , the linear complementarity problem LCP (R, q) is the following problem:
Definition 2.17 An n × n matrix R is called a Q-matrix if for every q ∈ R n the linear complementarity problem LCP(R, q) has at least one solution.
Definition 2.18 If an n × n matrix R is not a Q-matrix, then a vector q ∈ R n such that the linear complementarity problem LCP(R, q) has no solution, is called a witness of R.
Definition 2.19 Let Γ = (I, (C i ) i∈I , (Q i ) i∈I , P, u) be a general quitting game, such that each player has a single quitting action; that is, |Q i | = 1 for every i ∈ I. For every continue action profile c ∈ C, denote by R(Γ, c) the (|I| × |I|)-matrix whose i'th column is u(q i , c −i ).
Theorem 2.20 (Solan and Solan, 2018) Let Γ = (I, (C i ) i∈I , (Q i ) i∈I , P, u) be a positive recursive general quitting game, where Q i = {q i } for every player i.
• If the matrix R(Γ, c) is not a Q-matrix for every action profile c ∈ × i∈I ∆(C i ) of continue actions, then there is an absorbing stationary strategy profile x such that for every ε > 0 the stationary strategy x, supplemented with threats of punishment, is a uniform ε-equilibrium of Γ.
• If the matrix R(Γ, c) is a Q-matrix for some action profile c ∈ × i∈I ∆(C i ) of continue actions, then for every ε > 0 the game Γ admits a uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium ξ in which, after every finite history, at most one player i quits with positive probability, and does so with probability at most ε, while all other players play c −i .
Theorem 2.20 is valid in the case where some players have no quitting actions, as well as when the absorbing probabilities are smaller then 1, that is, P (a) ∈ (0, 1] whenever a i ∈ Q i for at least one player i ∈ I.
Quitting Absorbing Games
Quitting absorbing games are absorbing games where at least one player has a quitting action.
Definition 2.21 An absorbing game Γ = (I, (A i ) i∈I , P, u) is called a quitting absorbing game if for every i ∈ I, the set A i can be divided into two disjoint sets of continue actions and quitting actions,
• For every quitting action q i ∈ Q i and for every action profile
• For every continue action c i ∈ c i there is a continue action profile
• There is at least one quitting action, namely ∪ i∈I Q i = φ.
We denote a quitting absorbing game by Γ = (I, (C i ) i∈I , (Q i ) i∈I , P, u). In contrast to general quitting games, where the game continues with probability 1 as soon as no player plays a quitting action, in quitting absorbing games the game may absorb in this case.
Two-Dimensions Quitting Absorbing Games
We here define a simple class of quitting absorbing games, where two players have two continue actions, while all other players have a single continue action.
Definition 2.22 A two-dimension quitting absorbing game is a quitting absorbing game Γ = (I, (C i ) i∈I , (Q i ) i∈I , P, u) that satisfies |C 1 | = |C 2 | = 2 and |C i | = 1 for every i > 2.
In two-dimension quitting absorbing games, up to equivalences, there are 6 possible absorption structures for action profiles in × i∈I C i :
• All action profiles are absorbing. In this case the game is equivalent to a one-shot game.
• There are three absorption structures for which the game is a general quitting game, see Figure 1 .
• There are two additional absorption structures, see Figures 2.
If the absorption structure of Γ is equivalent to that in Figure 2 (left), then the game is called L-shaped. If the absorption structure of Γ is equivalent to that in Figure 2 (right), then the game is called spotted. Definition 2.23 An L-shaped game is a two-dimension quitting absorbing game Γ = (I, (C i ) i∈I , (Q i ) i∈I , P, u) with only one action profile a ∈ × i∈I C i such that P (a) > 0. Definition 2.24 A spotted game is an absorbing game Γ = (I, A = × i∈I A i , P, u) such that every two distinct non-absorbing action profiles differ by at least two coordinates. That is, if a = a ′ ∈ A are two non-absorbing action profiles, then there are i = j ∈ I such that a i = a ′ i and a j = a ′ j .
The game in Figure 2 (right) is a spotted game. We note that the definition of spotted games relates to every absorbing game, and not necessarily to two-dimension quitting absorbing games.
Main Results
The main results of the paper extend the existence of a uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium to the two new classes of games, defined in Section 2.6.
Theorem 2.25 Every positive recursive spotted game admits a uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium, for every ε > 0.
Section 3 is dedicated to the proof of Theorem 2.25.
Theorem 2.26 Every positive recursive two-dimension quitting absorbing game admits a uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium, for every ε > 0.
In view of Solan and Solan (2018) and Theorem 2.25, to prove Theorem 2.26 it is sufficient to prove the existence of a uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium in L-shaped two-dimension quitting absorbing games. This will be done in Section 4.
Spotted Games
In this section we prove Theorem 2.25. The proof is an adaptation of the proof of Solan and Solan (2019) . By Lemma 2.14, to prove that an absorbing game admits a sunspot ε-equilibrium, we can assume without loss of generality that the game is generic.
Step 1: Constructing best response matrices Let Γ = (I, (C i ) i∈I , (Q i ) i∈I , P, u) be a generic spotted game. For every nonabsorbing action profile a ∈ A and every player i ∈ I, the best absorbing deviation of player i against a is b i (a) := arg max a ′ i =a i u(a ′ i , a −i ). Since the game is spotted, all deviations of each player i from a are absorbing. Since the game is generic, the best absorbing deviation is uniquely defined. Let r i (a) := u(b i (a), a −i ). This is the payoff vector when player i optimally deviates from a. Let R(a) be the |I| × |I| matrix whose i-th column is r i (a). One of the following two conditions must hold:
is not a Q-matrix for every non-absorbing action profile a ∈ A.
Step 2: Case (E.1) yields a uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium Let a ′ ∈ A be such that R(a ′ ) is a Q-matrix. We show that in this case a sunspot ε-equilibrium exists for every ε > 0. Construct an auxiliary general quitting game Γ(a ′ ) = (I, (
By Theorem 2.20, the game Γ(a ′ ) admits a uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium ξ, where all players play the action profile a ′ ∈ A, and in each stage only one player plays the best absorbing deviation with a positive probability. The reader can verify that the strategy profile ξ is a uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium in Γ as well, since the best deviations from a ′ in both games Γ and Γ(a ′ ) are the same.
Step 3: Case (E.2) yields a stationary uniform ε-equilibrium The condition implies that for every non-absorbing action profile a ∈ A there is a vector q a ∈ R I such that the linear complementarity problem LCP(R(a), q a ) has no solution. Let Γ = (I, (C i ) i∈I , (Q i ) i∈I , P, u) be the auxiliary spotted game that is identical to Γ, except for the payoff at non-absorbing action profiles:
For every λ ∈ (0, 1] let x λ be a stationary λ-discounted equilibrium of Γ, such that the limit x 0 := lim λ→0 x λ exists. As in Solan and Solan (2019) , because R(a) is not a Q-matrix for every non-absorbing action profile, x 0 must be absorbing. Moreover, x 0 is a stationary uniform ε-equilibrium for every ε > 0.
The L-Shaped Game
In this section we prove the following result, which, together with Theorem 2.25 and Theorem 2.20, implies Theorem 2.26.
Lemma 4.1 Every positive recursive L-shaped game admits a uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium, for every ε > 0.
Throughout the section we will denote the two continue actions of Players 1 and 2 by C 1 = {c 1 1 , c 2 1 }, C 2 = {c 1 2 , c 2 2 }, respectively, and assume that P (c 2 1 , c 2 2 , c 3 , ..., c |I| ) > 0. We will use the following notations:
, and a 4 := (c 2 1 , c 2 2 , c 3 , ...c |I| ). 
Auxiliary Games
We start by introducing a collection of auxiliary games that are derived from the L-shaped game by turning some non-absorbing action profiles into absorbing action profiles.
be the quitting absorbing game that is defined as follows (see Figure 4 ):
• For every action profile a ∈ A such that a = a 2 , a 3 , we set P δ 1 ,δ 2 (a) := P (a) and u δ 1 ,δ 2 (a) := u(a).
In other words, the auxiliary game Γ δ 1 ,δ 2 is similar to Γ, but we turn one or two action profiles to absorbing, with absorbing payoff that is equal to u(a 4 ). The auxiliary game Γ δ 1 ,δ 2 is a quitting game if δ 1 , δ 2 > 0 and a general quitting game if max {δ 1 , δ 2 } > 0. Figure 4 : An L-shaped game Γ (left) and the auxiliary game Γ δ 1 ,δ 2 (right).
We will denote the min-max value of player i in the absorbing game Γ by v i (Γ) := min σ i max σ −i γ i (σ i , σ −i ) This is a lower bound on player i's equilibrium payoff. We will prove that the min-max value of each player in the auxiliary game is not lower by much than her min-max value in the original game. To this end we need the following result.
Lemma 4.3 Let Γ = (I, (A i ) i∈I , u, P ) be a positive recursive quitting absorbing game. Fix a player i ∈ I, such that |Q i | > 0. For every ε > 0 there exists T ε ∈ N such that for every strategy profile x −i there is a pure strategy a i of player i such that
• The probability of absorption up to time T ε under (a i , x −i ) is high:
Proof. Since the game is positive recursive, and since player i can obtain a positive payoff by quitting, then the min-max value of player i is positive, that is, v i (Γ) > 0. Fix ε > 0 sufficiently small. Let x −i ∈ × j =i C j be a strategy profile such that under (a i , x −i ) the play never absorbs, for every continue action action
We deduce that there is a quitting action q i ∈ Q i satisfies the requirements with T ε = 1, for every strategy profile x ′ −i for which P(absorption | (a i , x ′ −i )) ≤ ε for every a i ∈ A i . Let x −i be a strategy profile such that for some continue action c i ∈ C i of player i, under (c i , x −i ) the game absorbs. Then one of the following conditions holds:
• For every quitting action
In the first case, it follows that the quitting action q ′ i ∈ Q i satisfies the requirements with T ε = 1 against x −i . In the latter case, it follows that
. We deduce that the continue action c i satisfies the requirements with T ε = 1 ε 2 .
Lemma 4.4 Let Γ be a quitting absorbing game. Then for every ε > 0, there
Proof. Let i ∈ I. Since the game is positive and recursive, if
Then assume |Q i | > 0. Let ε > 0 and choose ε ′ ≤ ε 4 . Let σ i and T be, respectively, the strategy and the integer given by Lemma 4.3, with respect to player i and ε ′ in the game Γ.
If player i follows σ i in the game Γ δ 1 ,δ 2 , then with probability larger than 1 − ε ′ − T · δ 1 − T · δ 2 , the game is absorbed in the first T stages by an action profile that is absorbing in Γ as well. Denote by γ δ 1 ,δ 2 i (σ) the payoff of player i in Γ δ 1 ,δ 2 under σ. Then, since payoffs are bounded by 1,
Characterization of L-shaped games
In this section we divide L-shaped games into two classes of games. This partition is analogous to the one given in Theorem 2.20. We start by generalize the definition of best response matrix, presented in Definition 2.19.
the set of all best response matrices to the mixed action profile c in the game Γ.
Observation 4.6 Let δ 1 , δ 2 ∈ [0, 1), and let α 1 , α 2 ∈ (0, 1). If the matrix R is a best response matrix of Γ δ 1 ,δ 2 , then R is also a best response matrix of Γ α 1 δ 1 ,α 2 δ 2 .
Definition 4.7 An L-shaped game is called a QL game if there are δ 1 , δ 2 ∈ [0, 1) such that max {δ 1 , δ 2 } > 0 and at least one of the best response matrices of Γ δ 1 ,δ 2 is a Q-matrix.
Definition 4.8 An L-shaped game is called an NQL (non-Q L-shaped) game if the following sets do not contain a Q-matrix:
Obviously, every L-shaped game is either a QL game, an NQL game, or both. Section 4.3 will be dedicated to discuss QL games, while section 4.5 will be dedicated to discuss NQL games.
QL Games
In this section we prove that QL games admit uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium, for every ε > 0. The proof is similar to the proof of the analogous result for general quitting games, which was stated as Theorem 2.20.
Lemma 4.9 Let Γ = (I, (C i ) i∈I , (Q i ) i∈I , P, u) be a QL game. Then for every δ 1 , δ 2 ∈ (0, 1], at least one of the games Γ δ 1 ,δ 2 , Γ δ 1 ,0 , and Γ 0,δ 2 , admits a uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium. Moreover, in that game, there is a continue mixed action profile c ∈ C, such that at each stage of the sunspot ε-equilibrium, at most one player i quits with positive probability, and does so with probability at most ε, while all other players follow c −i .
is a QL game, according to Observation 4.6, at least one of the games Γ δ 1 ,δ 2 , Γ δ 1 ,0 , and Γ 0,δ 2 , admits a best response matrix R which is a Q-matrix. Denote this game by Γ ′ . By Theorem 2.20, the auxiliary game Γ ′ admits a uniform sunspot εequilibrium of the desired form.
Lemma 4.10 Let Γ = (I, (C i ) i∈I , (Q i ) i∈I , P, u) be a QL game. Then Γ admits a uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium, for every ε > 0.
Proof. Fix ε > 0. By Lemma 4.9, there are δ 1 , δ 2 ∈ [0, 1] such that max {δ 1 , δ 2 } > 0 and the auxiliary game
Assume without lost of generality that δ 1 > 0. The strategy profile ξ is determined by a continue mixed action profile c ξ ∈ C, such that at each stage of ξ, at most one player i quits with positive probability, and does so with probability at most ε 2 , while all other players follow c ξ −i . More formally, ξ has the following structure: Let c ξ be the continue mixed action profile from Lemma 4.9. The continue mixed action of Player 2 in this action profile is c ξ 2 := pc 1 2 + (1 − p)c 2 2 , where if δ 2 > 0 then p = 0. For every t ∈ N, a player i t ∈ I is chosen by the correlation device, alongside a quitting
and α t+1 ∈ (0, ε 2 ) are chosen by the correlation device, and the process is continue.
We will construct a sunspot strategy profile ξ in Γ that mimics ξ as follows. The idea is that the strategy profile ξ coincides with ξ until it is Player 1's turn to play the quitting action c 2 1 with small probability. Then, we will expand this turn into many stages, and let Player 2 play c 2 2 with at least small probability as well. On one hand, Player 2 will play c 2 2 with small probability so that no other player can gain more than ε by deviating. On the other hand, we will repeat this play for many stages so that all the other players can monitor Player 2. The probability of Players 1 and 2 to play simultaneity c 2 1 and c 2 2 in these stages will be equal to the quitting probability of Player 1 quitting with c 2 1 in the original equilibrium of the auxiliary game. If δ 2 > 0 as well, the symmetric process takes place when in ξ it is Player 2 turn to quit with action c 2 2 . Formally, the sunspot strategy profile ξ has the same structure as ξ: For every t ∈ N, a player i t ∈ I is chosen by the correlation device, alongside a quitting action q t it ∈ Q i , an integer M t ∈ N, and a deviation α t ∈ (0, ε 2 ). Player i t quits with probability α t using q t it for M t , while all the other players play a continue action. If the game is not absorb, then i t+1 ∈ I, q t+1
2 ) are chosen by the correlation device, and the process is continue. Denote by ρ(q i , c, α, M) := 1 − (1 − α · P (q i , c −i )) M the probability of the game Γ to absorb when player i plays the quitting action q i with probability α and the rest of the players play c −i for M stages. Note that if q i = c 2 1 , c 2 2 then ρ(q i , c , α, M) = ρ δ 1 ,δ 2 (q i , c, α, M), and that the payoff when this absorption occurs is equal, that is u(
The fashion of choosing i t and q t it in ξ is identical to the fashion of choosing i t and q t it in ξ. If q t it = c 2 1 , c 2 2 , then M t and α t are evaluate from i t , q t it , and the correlation device that same way M t and α t are evaluate from i t , q t it , and the correlation device.
We now construct M t and α t out of M t and α t when q t it = c 2 1 . Let p = max c ξ 2 (c 2 2 ), ε 2 , c 2 := pc 1 2 + (1 − p)c 2 2 , and c ξ,2 :
Note that if ξ is terminate after choosing quitting action c 2 1 , then the payoff is u(a 4 ) = u δ 1 ,δ 2 (a 3 ), which is the payoff if ξ is terminate after choosing quitting action c 2 1 . Therefore, if the correlation device choose quitting action c 2 1 at time t, the the sunspot strategy profiles ξ and ξ terminates at the same probability before time t + 1, and yields the same payoff if they terminate. We repeat this calculation for quitting action c 2 2 , if needed. Thus, we created a process given by ξ, which is similar to the process given by ξ in the following way -For every t ∈ dN, the probability of the process to be terminate after t stages, is equal. Moreover, if the processes are terminated after time t, the payoff they yield are equal. For every player i ≥ 3, the only new deviations are given due the change between c ξ to c ξ,2 and c ξ,1 . But, |c ξ − c ξ,2 |, |c ξ − c ξ,1 | ≤ ε 2 , then any deviation of a player in ξ is bounded by ε 2 + ε 2 . For Players 1 and 2, the only new deviation is not playing c ξ,2 2 and c ξ,1 1 respectively when needed. But, they are being monitored for lowering the probability for termination of the game by more then ε, while they have no incentive to boost this probability (since they can quit in ξ as well). Therefore, their deviation has no more then ε influence. Therefore, ξ is a uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium.
Additional Family of Auxiliary Games
In this section we define a second family of auxiliary games, which are similar to the auxiliary games Γ δ 1 ,δ 2 , with an additional property that one of the players is restricted in the mixed action he can play.
Definition 4.11 Let δ > 0 and let α ∈ [0, 1]. Let Γ = (I, (C i ) i∈I , (Q i ) i∈I , P, u) be an L-shaped game, and let Γ δ,0 = (I, (C i ) i∈I , (Q i ) i∈I , P δ,0 , u δ,0 ) be an auxiliary game of Γ. The auxiliary game Γ δ,0 α is defined similarly to Γ δ,0 with the following change: Player 2 cannot play the action c 2 2 with probability greater then α.
The auxiliary game Γ 0,δ α is defined analogously to the auxiliary game Γ δ,0 α , with Player 1 and action c 2 1 replacing the role of Player 2 and action c 2 2 . Both games Γ 0,δ 0 and Γ δ,0 0 are quitting games if δ > 0, and general quitting games for every δ ≥ 0. For every mixed action profile x with P (x) > 0, the undiscounted payoff under x in Γ is denote by
where P (x) = a∈A χ(a, x) = χ(A, x) is the per-stage probability of absorption under x in Γ.
The following lemma provides a condition for the existence of an almost stationary uniform ε-equilibrium.
Lemma 4.13 Let Γ be a generic L-shaped game. For every ε > 0 there exist δ ε , c ε > 0, such that if δ < δ ε , α ∈ [0, 1], and the mixed action x is a stationary equilibrium of Γ δ,0 α that satisfies 0 < P 1,0 (x) < c ε , then Γ admits an almost stationary uniform ε-equilibrium, Proof. Let Γ = (I, (C i ) i∈I , (Q i ) i∈I , P, u) be a generic L-shaped game. Fix ε > 0. We will prove that Γ admits a almost stationary uniform 18εequilibrium.
Step 1: Notations For every δ > 0, let Γ δ,0 = (I, (C i ) i∈I , (Q i ) i∈I , P δ,0 , u δ,0 ) be its auxiliary game. Denote by γ δ,0 (x) the undiscounted payoff of this auxiliary game. In this proof, we will refer c 2 1 as a quitting action. That is, the quitting actions in the game are
and the continue actions are
Thus, Player 2 is the only player to have two continue actions, while all other players have a single continue action. Denote all action profiles that contain a single quitting action by
Denote A 1 := A 1 \ {a 3 , a 4 }, and denote all action profiles that contain more then a single quitting action by
Since 0 < P 1,0 (x), it follows that 0 < P δ,0 (x), and x is absorbing in Γ δ,0 .
Therefore,
Define p min := min {P (a) | a ∈ A, a = a 1 , a 2 , a 3 }. Since by assumption P δ,0 (x) < c ε , it follows that for every player i ∈ I and every quitting action q i ∈ Q ′ i , we have x i (q i ) < cε p min . We will define a mixed action profile such that it is an almost stationary uniform 18ε-equilibrium in Γ.
Step 2: Influence of the action profiles in A >1 on the undiscounted payoff is negligible First, we prove that there is c ′ ε such that for every mixed action profile y, if y i (q i ) < c ′ ε for every quitting action q i of player i, for every i ∈ I, then χ(A >1 , y) P (y) < ε.
Note that 1 − P (y) ≥ (1 − c ′ ε ) |Q ′ | . Let q i ∈ Q ′ i be a quitting action of player i, such that q i = c 2 1 . We can bound from below the probability of player i to quit alone using q i by
Denote the quitting action profile that includes player i quitting with q i while other players quit as well by
We can bound from above the probability of player i to using q i alongside other players quitting by
Since it is true for every q i = c 2 1 ∈ Q i , we deduce χ(A >1 , y) < ε · P (y), as we wanted.
We can now approximate the undiscounted payoff of a mixed action profile with a small per-stage probability of absorbing. Let x be a strategy profile that satisfies
then χ(A >1 , x) < ε · P ( x). We can conclude these two boundaries of γ( x).
The first is an upper bound,
and the second is a lower bound,
Step 3: Variant of Step 2 for an action deviation We will prove a similar estimate as in Step 2, for a different mixed action profile: Let i ∈ I be a player, and let q i ∈ Q i be a quitting action of player i. Let y be a mixed action profile such that y(q ′ ) < c ′ ε for every q ′ = q i ∈ Q. We repeat the process as in Step 2. We know that
Denote the quitting action profile that includes player j quitting with q j while other players quit as well, but player i does not quit using q i , by
From both Eqs. (3) and (4) we can deduce again that if c
Hence, if x is a mixed action profile such that P ( x) < min p min 1 − 1
and q i ∈ Q i is a quitting action of player i such that q i = c 2 1 , then
From
Step 2, we get that if c i ∈ C i is a continue action, then
We conclude that for every deviation a i ∈ A i such that a i = c 2 1 , we have these two inequalities. The first is an upper bound of γ(a i ,
Step 4: Constructing an auxiliary mixed action profile x δ We define a mixed action profile x δ as follows,
In words, in x δ , Player 2 increases the probability of playing the action c 2 2 at the expense of the action c 1 2 . Note that χ δ,0 ({a 3 , a 4 } , x) = χ(a 4 , x δ ). We conclude that if c ε , δ < min p min 2 1 − 1
. Therefore, Eqs. (1) and (2) hold for the mixed action profile x δ , and Eqs. (5) and (6) hold for every action deviation of x δ . Note that for every mixed action profile y, and every two action profiles a, a ′ ∈ A 1 such that a −2 = a ′ −2 , a 2 = c 1 2 , and a ′ 2 = c 2 2 , we have
Therefore, we deduce that
Step 5: Constructing an auxiliary mixed action profile x δ,η Let η > 0. We here define x δ,η , a mixed action profile which is a variant of x δ . Denote the maximal probability in which a player plays a quitting action under x by x max := max {x i (q i ) | i ∈ I, q i ∈ Q ′ i }. We will define action profile which presents the relative weight of playing the quitting actions in ∪ i∈I Q i , while ensuring that each quitting action is played with probability at most η. If η ≥ x max , then define x δ,η := x δ . Otherwise, for every i ∈ I such that i = 2, define
For every quitting action q 2 ∈ Q ′ 2 of Player 2, define
and for the continue actions c 1 2 and c 2 2 , define x δ,η 2 to satisfy the following two equations:
Eq. (8) ensures that x δ,η 2 is a mixed action profile, while Eq. (9) ensures that while Player 2 plays continue actions, the ratio of the probabilities to play the continue actions c 1 2 and c 2 2 under x δ and under x δ,η are the same. For every η > 0, every mixed action profile y, and every auxiliary mixed action profile y η , we have
, then Eqs. (1), (2), (5), (6), and (7) hold for x δ,η .
Step 6: Statistical tests We constructed a stationary strategy profile that is absorbing at every stage with low probability. Under this stationary strategy profile, Player 2 plays both actions c 1 2 and c 2 2 with positive probability, and he may profit by increasing the frequency in which he plays one of the actions at the expense of the other. To deter such detections, we add statistical tests to the strategy profile. If all players play non-absorbing stationary mixed action, they can verify whether a deviation by one of the players occur, using statistical test on the realized strategies. By Solan (1999, Section 5 .3), if stationary mixed action profile absorbs with a small probability in each turn, then this statistical test can still be uphold. That is, for our case, for stationary mixed action and every ε ′ > 0, there is η(ε ′ ) > 0 such that if the game absorb with probability smaller then η(ε ′ ) in each turn, then the players determine if player i play the continue mixture y i , or deviate from it by more then ε ′ . Formally, for every ε ′ > 0, there is an integer T ε ′ ∈ N, such that if {x m } m∈N are i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables with parameter x, then their average, after at least time T ε ′ , from x is small enough. That is,
Let η(δ · ε) > 0 be the constant related to δ · ε, and set η ′ := η(δ · ε) |A| .
Therefore, the players can identifying a deviation of Player 2 from x δ,η ′ , in scale of δ · ε. Let η ≤ η ′ . Define by σ δ,η a strategy similar to x δ,η , with the addition of statistical test by Players 1, 3, 4, . . . , |I| whether the realized actions of Player 2 up to time T are close to x δ,η 2 , for every large enough T . We will show that if every player i ∈ I cannot gain more then ε by deviating from σ δ,η to action a i ∈ A i such then a i / ∈ C ′ 2 , then Player 2 cannot gain more then 2ε by changing the distribution of her continue actions. We assumed that every quitting action q 2 ∈ Q 2 is less than an ε-efficient deviation against x δ,η −2 . Let C −2 := c 1 1 × i≥3 c i be the continue action profile of all players but Player 2. Since P ( x δ,η ) < c ε , we have
Hence, for every q 2 ∈ Q 2 ,
Since C −2 is a possible strategy of Players 1, 3, . . . , |I|, the min-max value of Player 2 is bounded by her best response to C −2 . The game Γ is positive and recursive, and therefore v 2 (Γ) ≤ max 0, γ 2 ( x δ,η ) + 3ε = γ 2 (σ δ,η ) + 3ε.
We conclude that if η < η ′ , c ε < ε 1+ε , and every player i ∈ I cannot gain more then ε by deviating from σ δ,η to action a i ∈ A i such that a i / ∈ C ′ 2 , than Player 2 cannot gain more then 3ε by deviating from σ δ,η , and it is a 3ε-equilibrium. Note that if κ ∈ [1, ∞) is a positive constant, and every player i ∈ I cannot gain more then κε by deviating from σ δ,η to action a i ∈ A i such that a i / ∈ C ′ 2 , then c ε < ε 1+ε implies that Player 2 cannot gain more then 3κε by deviating from σ δ,η , since ε 1+ε ≤ κε 1+κε .
Step 7: Constructing the almost stationary uniform 18ε-equilibrium
Let η ′ be as defined in Step 6 and η < η ′ . Let δ < min ε 3 ,
. We will prove that every player i ∈ I cannot gain more then 6ε by deviating from σ δ,η to action a i ∈ A i such that a i / ∈ C ′ 2 , thus, together with Step 6, completing the proof. Fix i ∈ I, and an action a i ∈ A i such that a i / ∈ C ′ 2 . We will prove that
. In Eq. (5) we found an upper bound to γ(a i , x δ,η −i ):
We will use the equivalence of x δ,η and x δ . By Eq. (10)
Using Eq. (7), We can switch between the games Γ and Γ δ,0 . Since 3δ < ε, we get that
We relate the result to γ(a i , x −i ), through its lower bound presented in Eq.
:
Since the mixed action profile x is an equilibrium in the game Γ, we get that
By the upper bound of γ(x), presented in Eq.
(1), we get
We use Eq. (7), to switch again between the games Γ and Γ δ,0
We use again the equivalence of x δ,η and x δ,η . By Eq. (10)
By the lower bound of γ(x), presented in Eq.
(2), we conclude that
By definition γ( x δ,η ) + 6ε = γ(σ δ,η ) + 6ε, and the result follows.
Note that the same is true for the symmetric case of Γ 0,δ α and P 0,1 : for every ε > 0 there exist δ ε , c ε > 0, such that if δ < δ ε , α ∈ [0, 1], and the mixed action x is a stationary equilibrium of Γ 0,δ α that satisfies 0 < P 0,1 (x) < c ε , then the game Γ admits an almost stationary uniform ε-equilibrium.
NQL Games
In this section we study NQL games. These games are similar to general quitting games that satisfy the second condition in Theorem 2.20. The following lemma was proven by Solan and Solan (2018, Section 3.2, Case 3) . This lemma claims that the limit of discount equilibria cannot be a continue action, if the continue payoff is a witness of the best response matrix.
Lemma 4.14 Let Γ = (I, (C i ) i∈I , (Q i ) i∈I , P, u) be a generic quitting game whose best response matrix is not a Q-matrix. Let q ∈ R |I| be a witness for this matrix. Denote by Γ(q) = (I, (C i ) i∈I , (Q i ) i∈I , P, u) the quitting game that it similar to Γ, except that the non-absorbing payoff is q; that is, u(c) := q. For every λ > 0, let x λ be a λ-discounted stationary equilibrium of Γ(q). Then lim λ→0 x λ is absorbing in Γ(q).
We will prove a similar version of this lemma, which claims that the limit of undiscounted equilibria in the auxiliary games cannot be the action profile a 1 .
Lemma 4.15 Let Γ = (I, (C i ) i∈I , (Q i ) i∈I , P, u) be an NQL game. Let δ : N → [0, 1] 2 \ {(0, 0)} be a function such that lim n→∞ δ(n) = 0. Let (x n ) n∈N be a converging sequence of mixed action profiles such that x n is a stationary equilibrium in the auxiliary game Γ δ(n) for every n ∈ N, and define x ∞ := lim n→∞ x n . Then, x ∞ = a 1 .
Proof. Assume by contradiction that x ∞ = a 1 .
Step 1: Defining auxiliary games Since lim n→∞ δ(n) = 0, there exists a sequence M := {m n } ∞ n=1 of natural numbers, that satisfies one of the following conditions:
(M1) The two sequences {δ 1 (m n )} ∞ n=1 and {δ 2 (m n )} ∞ n=1 are strictly decreasing and positive. That is, for every n < n ′ ∈ N, we have 0 < δ 1 (m n ′ ) < δ 1 (m n ) and 0 < δ 2 (m n ′ ) < δ 2 (m n ).
(M2) The sequence {δ 1 (m n )} ∞ n=1 is strictly decreasing and positive, while δ 2 (m) = 0 for every m ∈ M.
(M3) The sequence {δ 2 (m n )} ∞ n=1 is strictly decreasing and positive, while δ 1 (m) = 0 for every m ∈ M.
Condition (M3) is symmetric to condition (M2), hence we assume without loss of generality that we have a subsequence M ⊆ N of infinity size that satisfies either condition (M1) or condition (M2). Let Γ M = (I, (C i ) i∈I , (Q i ) i∈I , P M , u M ) be the quitting game defined as follows:
• P M (a) = 1 for every a = a 1 , a 2 ∈ A, and P M (a 1 ) = 0,
• If M satisfies Condition (M1): P M (a 2 ) = 1, and u M = u 0.5,0.5 ,
• If M satisfies Condition (M2): P M (a 2 ) = 0, and u M = u 0.5,0 .
By Observation 4.6, the best response matrices of Γ M coincide with the best response matrices of Γ δ(m) for every m ∈ M. Consequently, the game Γ M is NQL game.
Step 2: Representing lim m→∞ u δ(m) (x m ) Recall that P δ(m) (x m ) is the probability under the strategy profile x m that the auxiliary game Γ δ(m) terminates in a single stage. For every action profile a ∈ A, let z(a) := lim m→∞ x m (a) · P δ(m) (a) P δ(m) (x m ) be the limit probability of absorption by action profile a under x m . We claim that
+(z(c 2 1 , c 1 2 , a 1 −1,2 ) + z(c 1 1 , c 2 2 , a 1 −1,2 ) +z(c 2 1 , c 2 2 , a 1 −1,2 )) · u(a 4 ). To show that Eq. (11) holds, we recall that
We will show that z(a) = 0 for every action profile a ∈ (q i , a 1 −i ) q i ∈Q i ∪ {a 2 , a 3 , a 4 }. Let then a be such an action profile, and let i 1 , . . . , i k be the players such that a i j ∈ Q i j is a quitting action. We can assume without loss of generality that (i 1 , a i 1 ) = (1, c 2 1 ), (2, c 2 2 ). Then a i 1 ∈ Q i 1 and P δ(m) (a 1 −i 1 , a i 1 ) is independent of m and δ. Because x ∞ = a 1 is non-absorbing in Γ δ(m) , for every i ∈ {i 1 , ...i k }, we have lim m→∞ x m i (a i ) = 0. Hence, 3
It follows that x m (a 1 −i 1 ,...,−i k , a i 1 , . . . , a i k ) ≪ x m (a 1 −i 1 , a i 1 ), and the claim follows.
Step 3: Constructing best response action profiles Since x m is a stationary equilibrium in Γ δ(m) , and since x ∞ = a 1 , for every player i and every action a i = a 1 i ∈ A i , if x m i (a i ) > 0 for every large enough m, then a i is a best response against a 1 −i in the game Γ δ(m) . Therefore, for every player i ∈ I who satisfies P δ(m) (x m i , a 1 −i ) > 0 for every m sufficient large, every action profile y i that assigns a positive probability only to actions a i ∈ A i that satisfy x m i (a i ) > 0 (for every m sufficiently large), is a best response to a 1 −i in Γ M , since they have the same best response matrices.
We now define such a mixed action profile, y. For every player i = 1,
Thus, y i represents the proportion probability of the player to quit with a specific action. For Player 1, we increase the probability to play the action c 2 1 by an amount that depends on the probability of the game to be absorb in a 4 . If x m (a 4 ) > 0 then x m 1 (c 2 1 ) > 0 and x m 2 (c 2 2 ) > 0. Let P δ(m)
1,2 (x m ) > 0 for every m sufficient large, the following action profile is a best response of Player 1 against a 1 −1 in Γ M :
Step 4: The contradiction The matrix R := (r i ) i∈I is a best response matrix in Γ M , and therefore it is not a Q-matrix. We will derive a contradiction by showing that the linear complementary problem LCP(R, q) has a solution, for every q ∈ R |I| . Let z := (z 1 , . . . , z |I| ), where
If z 1 = 0, define r 1 := 0. Otherwise, define
u(a 4 ).
If z 2 = 0, define r 2 := 0. Otherwise, define
For every player i = 1, if z i = 0, define r i := 0. Otherwise, define
Set w := lim m→∞ u δ(m) (x m ) to be the limit payoff under x m . Since the game is positive, w ∈ R |I| + . We note that:
Indeed, Condition (Q1) is given by Eq. (12). Condition (Q2) follows from the definitions. Conditions (Q3) and (Q4) hold by the definition of equilibrium: for every δ sufficient small and for every i ∈ I, player i cannot gain more than the equilibrium payoff while quitting alone, since the quitting probability of all other players is small, and quitting alone is an option for player i in the game. If z i > 0, then player i quits with a positive probability and he is indifferent between quitting alone and the equilibrium payoff. Conditions (Q1)-(Q4) imply that R is a Q-matrix, a contradiction.
The next lemma asserts that if the limit of a sequence of stationary equilibria is absorbing in a sequence of games, then the limit is an equilibrium in the limit game. The claim is similar to Lemma 4 of Vrieze and Thuijsman (1989) , hence its proof is omitted.
Lemma 4.16 Let Γ = (I, (C i ) i∈I , (Q i ) i∈I , P, u) be an NQL game. Let δ : N → [0, 1] 2 \ {(0, 0)} be a function such that lim n→∞ δ(n) = 0. Let (x n ) n∈N be a converging sequence of mixed action profiles such that x n is a stationary equilibrium in the auxiliary game Γ δ(n) for every n ∈ N, and set x ∞ := lim n→∞ x n . If x ∞ is absorbing in Γ, that is, P (x ∞ ) > 0, then x ∞ is a stationary uniform 0-equilibrium of Γ.
The following theorem, presented original by Browder (1960) will be helpful during Lemma 4.18.
Theorem 4.17 (Browder, 1960) Let X ⊆ R n be a convex and compact set, and let F : [0, 1] × X → X be a continuous function. Define
In the notations of Browder's Theorem, by Kakutani's Fixed Point Theorem, every set-valued function F : X → X with non-empty and convex values and closed graph has at least one fixed point. Browder's Theorem states that when the set-valued function F depends continuously on a one-dimensional parameter whose range is [0, 1], the set of fixed points, as a function of the parameter, has a connected component whose projection to the set of parameters is [0, 1].
We are now ready to prove the main result of this section: every NQL game admits an almost stationary ε-equilibrium.
Lemma 4.18 Let Γ = (I, (C i ) i∈I , (Q i ) i∈I , P, u) be an NQL game. Then for every ε > 0, the game Γ admits an almost stationary uniform ε-equilibrium.
Proof. By Lemma 2.14, we can assume without loss of generality that Γ is a generic game. Fix ε > 0.
Step 1: Construction of a continuous game-valued function Since the game Γ is an NQL game, the best response matrices of the games Γ 1,1 , Γ 1,0 0 , and Γ 0,1 0 are not Q-matrices. Let q, q 1 and q 2 be witnesses of these matrices (respectfully). Denote Θ := [−1, 2], Ω := (0, 1], and Q := {q, q 1 , q 2 }. For every θ ∈ Θ and every ω ∈ Ω, define
The function (ω, θ) → Γ ω,θ (Q) maps an auxiliary game to each pair of parameters (ω, θ) ∈ Ω × Θ. This function is continuous, in the sense that the absorption function and the payoff function change continuously with ω and θ. For every ω ∈ Ω, in the game Γ ω,−1 (Q) Player 2 cannot play the action c 2 2 . As θ increases from −1 to 0, the probability by which Player 2 can play the action c 2 2 in the game Γ ω,θ (Q) increases to 1, yet this action does not guarantee absorption. As θ increases from 0 to 1, the probability of absorption under a 2 (respectively a 3 ) increases to ω (respectively decreases to 0). As θ increases from 1 to 2, the probability by which Player 1 can play the action c 2 1 decreases from 1 to 0. The non-absorbing payoff changes with θ as well:
As θ increases to 0, it changes linearly from q 2 to q; as θ increases from 0 to 1, it remains q; and as θ increases from 1 to 2, it changes linearly from q to q 1 .
Step 2: Applying Browder's Theorem For every λ > 0, every ω ∈ Ω, and every θ ∈ Θ, let Ξ λ ω (θ) be the set of all λ-discounted stationary equilibria of the auxiliary game Γ ω,θ (Q). Fix for a moment ω ∈ Ω and λ > 0. Define Browder (1960) implies that the set M λ ω has a connected component whose projection to the first coordinate is Θ. Denote this connected component by
The sets (M λ ω ) λ,ω , (M 0 ω ) ω , and M 0 0 are all semi-algebraic sets, hence the sets (M 0 ω ) ω are connected and their projection to the first coordinate is Ω. Consequently, the same holds for the set M 0 0 .
Step 3: Notations Since (M 0 ω ) ω and M 0 0 are connected sets whose projection to the first coordinate is Ω, there exist continuous semi-algebraic functions (θ 0 ω ) ω , θ 0 0 : [0, 1] → Θ, and (ξ 0 ω ) ω , ξ 0 0 : [0, 1] → (× i∈I ∆(A i )), such that (a) the image θ 0 0 and θ 0 ω for every ω ∈ Ω is Θ,
Without loss of generality, we can assume that for every ω ∈ Ω we have θ 0 ω (0), θ 0 0 (0) = −1 and θ 0 ω (1), θ 0 0 (1) = 2. Denote by Γ(ω, β) the auxiliary game Γ ω,θω(β) (Q). We divide the interval [0, 1] into smaller intervals, which represent the different type of the auxiliary game admitted by Γ(ω, β). This is done as follows. Define recursively
The definition ends when ρ i = 1. Since θ 0 0 (·) is a semi-algebraic function, it enters the interval (0, 1) finitely many times. Therefore, there is an integer i ∈ N such that ρ i = 1. If β ∈ (ρ i , τ i+1 ), then for small enough ω, the auxiliary game Γ(ω, β) has the structure of the game Γ δ 1 ,δ 2 , where δ 1 = θ ω (β) · ω and δ 2 = (1 − θ ω (β)) · ω. If β ∈ (τ i , ρ i ), then for small enough ω, the auxiliary game Γ(ω, β) has the structure of either the game Γ δ,0 α or the game Γ 0,δ α , for some δ and α.
Step 4: Properties of ξ 0 0 (β) for ρ i ≤ β ≤ τ i+1 By the definition of τ and ρ, if ρ i < β < τ i+1 then 0 < θ 0 0 (β) < 1, and Γ(ω, β) is Γ δ 1 ,δ 2 , with δ 1 = θ ω (β) · ω and δ 2 = (1 − θ ω (β)) · ω. If β ∈ {ρ i , τ i+1 }, then θ 0 0 (β) ∈ {0, 1}, and the auxiliary game Γ(ω, β) is either Γ δ,0 or Γ 0,δ , for some δ > 0. We will present some properties of both ξ 0 ω and ξ 0 0 in these cases. Lemma 4.14 implies the following.
Claim 4.19 For every ω ∈ (0, 1], if ρ i < β < τ i+1 then ξ 0 ω (β) is absorbing in Γ(ω, β).
From Claim 4.19 we deduce that ξ 0 ω (β) is an equilibrium in Γ(ω, β) for every ω > 0. Since lim ω→0 ξ 0 ω (β) = ξ 0 0 (β), using Lemma 4.15 we obtain the following result Claim 4.20 For every ρ i < β < τ i+1 , we have ξ 0 0 (β) = a 1 . As the following claim asserts, Claim 4.20 extends to β = ρ i and β = τ i+1 .
Claim 4.21 ξ 0 0 (ρ i ), ξ 0 0 (τ i+1 ) = a 1 . Proof. We will argue that ξ 0 0 (ρ i ) = a 1 ; the proof for ξ 0 0 (τ i+1 ) is analogous. Since ξ 0 ω (β) is an equilibrium in Γ(ω, β) for every ω > 0 and every It is left to handle the case where ξ 0 0 (β) = (1 − t β )a 1 + t β a 2 or ξ 0 0 (β) = (1 − t β )a 1 + t β a 3 , for every β ∈ [ρ i , τ i+1 ], where t β > 0. The interval [ρ i , τ i+1 ] is called a type 1 interval if ξ 0 0 (β) = (1 − t β )a 1 + t β a 2 for every β ∈ [ρ i , τ i+1 ]. The interval [ρ i , τ i+1 ] is called a type 2 interval if ξ 0 0 (β) = (1 − t β )a 1 + t β a 3 for every β ∈ [ρ i , τ i+1 ]. We argue that the interval [ρ i , τ i+1 ] is either a type 1 interval or a type 2 interval. Indeed, otherwise, there are β, β ′ ∈ [ρ i , τ i+1 ], such that ξ 0 0 (β) = (1 − t β )a 1 + t β a 2 and ξ 0 0 (β ′ ) = (1 − t β ′ )a 1 + t β a 3 . The continuity of ξ implies that one of the following two conditions holds:
(ι) ξ 0 0 (β ′′ ) = a 1 for some β ′′ ∈ [ρ i , τ i+1 ], (ιι) ξ 0 0 (β ′′ ) is absorbing in the game Γ for some β ′′ ∈ [ρ i , τ i+1 ]. The former alternative is impossible due to Claim 4.20, while by Claim 4.22, the latter alternative implies that the game Γ admits an almost stationary ε-equilibrium. It follows that it is left to handle the case where [ρ i , τ i+1 ] is either a type 1 interval or a type 2 interval.
Step 5: Properties of ξ 0 0 (β) where τ i ≤ β ≤ ρ i By the definition of τ and ρ, if τ i ≤ β ≤ ρ i then either θ 0 0 (β) ≤ 0, in which case Γ(ω, β) = Γ ω,0 α for some α ∈ [0, 1]; or θ 0 0 (β) ≥ 1, in which case Γ(ω, β) = Γ 0,δ α for some α ∈ [0, 1].
Claim 4.23 There exists c ′ ε > 0, such that for every β ∈ [0, 1], if θ 0 0 (β) ≤ 0 and 0 < P 0,1 (ξ 0 0 (β)) < c ′ ε , then Γ admits an almost stationary ε-equilibrium.
Proof. Let c ε , δ ε > 0 be given by Lemma 4.13, and set c ′ ε := cε 2 . If 0 < P 0,1 (ξ 0 0 (β)) < c ′ ε , then there are β ′ close to β and ω < δ ε , such that 0 < P 0,1 (ξ 0 ω (β ′ )) < c ε . The result follows from Lemma 4.13.
An analogous result holds when θ 0 0 (β) ≥ 1.
Claim 4.24 There exist c ε > 0, such that for every β ∈ [0, 1], if θ 0 0 (β) ≥ 1 and 0 < P 1,0 (ξ 0 0 (β)) < c ε , then the game Γ admits an almost stationary ε-equilibrium.
Claim 4.25 Let β, β ′ ∈ [τ i , ρ i ]. If there are t, t ′ ∈ (0, 1] such that ξ 0 0 (β) = (1−t)a 1 +ta 2 and ξ 0 0 (β ′ ) = (1−t ′ )a 1 +t ′ a 3 , then Γ admits an almost stationary ε-equilibrium.
Proof. Without loss of generality, θ 0 0 (β ′′ ) ≤ 0 for every β ′′ ∈ [τ i , ρ i ]. We know that P 0,1 (ξ 0 0 (β)) > 0 and P 0,1 (ξ 0 0 (β ′ )) = 0. By the intermediate value theorem, there is β ′′ between β and β ′ , such that 0 < P 0,1 (ξ 0 0 (β)) < c ′ ε . The result follow from Claim 4.23.
We deduce from Claim 4.25 that if [ρ i , τ i+1 ] is a type 1 interval (and therefore ξ 0 0 (τ i+1 ) = (1 − t)a 1 + ta 2 , for some t > 0), and [ρ i+1 , τ i+2 ] is a type 2 interval, (and therefore ξ 0 0 (ρ i+1 ) = (1 − t ′ )a 1 + t ′ a 3 , for some t ′ > 0), then Γ admits an almost stationary ε-equilibrium. Hence, it left to handle the case where all intervals [ρ i , τ i+1 ] have the same type.
Step 6: The connected component ends Without loss of generality, assume that all intervals [ρ i , τ i+1 ] have type 1. Then, ξ 0 0 (ρ 1 ) = (1 − t)a 1 + ta 2 (where t > 0), and hence P 0,1 (ξ 0 0 (ρ 1 )) = 0. If ξ 0 0 (0) is not a mixture of a 1 and a 2 , then P 0,1 (ξ 0 0 (0)) > 0. Therefore, for every c > 0, there is β ∈ [τ 1 , ρ 1 ] such that 0 < P 0,1 (ξ 0 0 (β)) < c. By Claim 4.23, the game Γ admits an almost stationary ε-equilibrium.
If ξ 0 0 (0) is a mixture of a 1 and a 2 , then, since θ 0 0 (0) = −1, we deduce that ξ 0 0 (0) = a 1 . We will prove that this case is not possible, and conclude the proof. As in Claim 4.19, one can show that ξ 0 ω (0) = a 1 for every ω > 0. Therefore ξ 0 ω (0) are equilibria in Γ(ω, 0) for every ω > 0. The game lim ω→0 Γ(ω, 0) is a general quitting game with a single player who has two continue actions, while the other players have a single continue action. Since lim ω→0 ξ 0 ω (0) = a 1 , this is a contradiction, as in Claim 4.21.
Uniform Sunspot ε-equilibrium
In this section we prove Lemma 4.1, which state that every positive recursive L-shaped game admits a uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium, thus completing the proof of Theorem 2.26. Proof. Let ε > 0, and let Γ be an L-shaped game. Γ is either NQL game or QL game. If Γ is an NQL game, then then by Lemma 4.18, it admits an almost uniform ε-equilibrium. If Γ is a QL game, then by Lemma 4.10, it admits a uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium.
Discussion
The problem that inspired this paper is whether every stochastic game admits a uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium. Solan and Solan (2018) proved that every general quitting game admits such an equilibrium, and in this paper, we proved the result to another family of absorbing games. To do so, we developed two techniques that were used in this paper. The first technique, which was introduced in Section 3, consists of dividing the set of non-absorbing mixed action profiles to equivalence classes. Two mixed action profiles, x and y, are in the same equivalence class if there is i such that x −i = y −i . In spotted games, each equivalence class is composed of a single action profile. We then considered, for each equivalence class, an auxiliary game where all mixed action profiles that do not belong to that class are absorbing. We then showed that a uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium in such an auxiliary game, in which the players play mainly a non-absorbing mixed action profile is a uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium in the original game. We also proved that if all these auxiliary games do not admit a uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium, in which the players play mainly a non-absorbing mixed action profile, then a uniform absorbing stationary 0-equilibrium exists. The second technique, which was introduced in Section 4, consists of two families of auxiliary games, where the limit of λ-discounted ε-equilibrium in the auxiliary games allow us to explore and find uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium in the original game. We believe that by combining these two techniques, one can proved the existence of a uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium in more general families of absorbing games, specifically in quitting absorbing games, that were introduced in Definition 2.21.
